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Abstract 
The extension of banking activities during the XIX century was mainly leaded by certain 
social groups related to commerce, which took profit from their experience and knowledge to spread 
their influence among the credit world. In the Spanish historiography, there are some works 
specifically focused on these people, but very few of them make a classification of the economic 
groups who led the financial modernization of Spain along the mid 19th century. 
The main objective of our work is the analysis of the social group which constituted the Banco 
de Barcelona between 1844 and 1854. This institution was as important for the financial and banking 
history of Spain as a pioneer in their credit an issue activity; moreover its experience served as a base 
for the constitution of the modern Spanish financial system.  
In a society like the Catalan in mid 19th century, the confidence is an important factor to 
explain the investment. The appearance of new companies and its investment requirements 
transformed the previous guidelines. How was the behaviour of the potential investments? Did a 
powerful investing group grow around the bank and ascended economically throughout the central 
years of the 19th century? The result shows how de members of the board administration of the Banco 
de Barcelona, were concentred in some of the groups of the whole of the Catalan economy. 
Keywords: Social networks, banking formation, Barcelona. JEL Codes: N23, G21 
Resum 
L’extensió de les activitats bancàries al segle XIX va ser liderat per alguns grups socials 
connectats amb el comerç, que van treure profit de la seva experiència i coneixement per estendre la 
seva influència al voltant del món del crèdit. A la historiografia espanyola, hi ha un conjunt de treballs 
que s’han centrat en aquesta gent, però en molts pocs casos s’ha fet una classificació que permeti 
detectar el conjunt de grups econòmics que han liderat el procés de modernització financera de 
l’Espanya de mitjans del segle XIX. 
El principal objectiu del treball és l’anàlisi dels grups socials que van formar el Banco de 
Barcelona entre 1844 i 1854. Aquesta institució va ser important per a la història financera i bancària 
d’Espanya per ser pionera en la seva activitat creditícia i d’emissió: a més, la seva experiència va 
servir com a base en la constitució d’un sistema financer modern a Espanya. 
En una societat com la catalana de mitjans del segle XIX, la confiança era un factor important 
per explicar la decisió d’invertir. L’aparició de noves companyies i les seves necessitats d’inversió van 
transformar el comportaments previs. Quin va ser el comportament dels inversors potencials? Va ser el 
grup que hi havia al voltant del banc el que va ascendir econòmicament en els anys centrals del segle 
XIX? La resposta és prou clara, els membres del consell d’administració del Banc de Barcelona 
formaven un grup apart dins dels grups que sorgeixen a l’economia catalana en el seu conjunt.  
Paraules clau: Xarxes socials, formació bancària, Barcelona. Codis JEL: N23, G21 
 3
Introduction 
The new possibilities opened by the industrialization, the development of 
the capital markets and their internationalization, incentivated the appearance 
and diffusion of the banks and the extension of the financial instruments. The 
investment, one of the central factors to stimulate and to consolidate the 
economic growth, turned out to be boosted. One of the elements that stimulated 
the investment was the adoption of the principle of limited responsibility. It 
favoured a broad participation of the investors in the constitution of firms, 
besides facilitating the accumulation of capital and limiting the risks. Before 
that, in Spain, the constitution of corporations was strongly restricted during the 
first half of the 19th century, being liberalized gradually from 1850. This is the 
framework of this paper. 
The social, economical and political conditions of the 19th century, with a 
given level of information and communication technologies, made the 
investment choice to be ruled through confidence relations among investors. The 
economic players obtained the information through the existing social networks. 
Naomi Lamoreaux in her study on the impact of bank activities over industrial 
development, highlighted the importance of links between bank boards to 
explain the diffusion of the credit and the capital accumulation. These 
endogenous practices of insider lending, seem to play an important role in the 
extension of the investment and in the development of business entrepreneur 
shipment in New England at mid 19th century1. Thus, these networks of 
economic and personal relations are indeed a key element to explain the 
development of the economy. 
A social network is a social structure composed by nodes, corresponding 
to organizations or individuals, which are linked through different proximity 
variables that cover a broadly range of familiarity or economics connections. 
                                           
1 Lamoreaux (1994). 
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Alternatively, social networks can be understood as networks of information 
flows circulating through different organizations, institutions and informal 
spaces, which are especially significant in highly uncertain contexts facilitating 
the decrease of information costs2. 
The formation of investment networks during a period when the Spanish 
economy was making a huge modernization effort is very relevant. The 
development of the different kinds of corporations in mid 19th century had an 
important ally in those networks, which also had a huge influence on the 
characteristics of the business weaving. 
Our objective is to analyse the investment social network around the 
members of the administration board of the Banco de Barcelona between 1844 
and 1854 (BB net, from now on)3, and observe their role within the investment 
network resulting from the links of the most important investors in Catalonia 
during the first half of the 19th century (G net, from now on). We believe that the 
BB net was important in a double sense. It reduced the cost of information in the 
investment choice and made easy the control and the monitoring of their client’s 
operations. We also think that BB net was a compact network and it was 
participated by the most important investment groups of the Catalan’s economic 
society. In that direction, Blasco et al. (2007) had studied how the members of 
the Banco de Barcelona oriented their investment through non-industrial sectors, 
hypothesis corroborated by other authors4. 
                                           
2 Granovetter (1973),  Wasserman and Faust (1994), Molina and Marsal (2002), Bogartti and 
Foster (2003) 
3 We stop in 1854 because of a huge modification of the analysis framework due to important 
legal changes. More concretely, the laws on railroads (1855), and issue banks and credit 
societies (1856), pushed up the investment. Making difficult any kind of comparison with 
previous years.  
4 Carles Sudrià, gathering the thesis about the role placed of the banks in the industrialization, 
pointed out the weakness of the banking system in Catalonia (Sudrià, 1982). New research on 
it uncovers that the huge industry funding were, actually, auto-funding. The bank system 
played a secondary role as Jordi Nadal and Enric Ribas have been said. Nadal y Ribas (1992), 
Soler (2000) y Prat (2006). 
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The use of joint investment made by two players as a criterion to draw a 
link among them, in the configuration of a social network is not new5. Certainly, 
this assumption on investments in public limited companies could be considered 
weak because the economic responsibility is limited, and the owners changed 
quickly. In the Catalan economy of mid 19th century, investment choices were 
conditioned by the reputation firms’ managers and directors of the directives of 
the firms. Social control and confidence relations were strong to impede the 
investment choice as an individual act. The methodology used is similar to that 
one applied on the studies of the links between firms among the members of 
board meetings (Interlocking Directorates)6 that, in some cases, also study the 
role played by banks7. In fact, the study of the businesses networks formed 
among their board meetings, and the related power relations, have been reported 
in the literature on analysis of social networks for several decades, 8. 
Our main sources are the original documentation of the Banco de 
Barcelona (Actas de las Juntas de Accionistas, Dirección y Gobierno), the 
printed Memorias of the institution and other sources of those years (basically 
newspapers). To identify the investments of the members of the boardroom of 
the bank we have used the Base de Dades Empreses i Empresaris a la 
Catalunya del segle XIX del Departament d’Història i Institucions Econòmiques 
(Universitat de Barcelona) (BDDHiIE-UB as follows). It is built from the 
collection of notary’s documentation of those years. We know the number of 
shares which were paid by the shareholders when the societies were inscribed at 
the notary. The notary districts of Barcelona, Girona and Tarragona between 
1815 and 1866 were analysed to identify the shareholders who registered the 
                                           
5 Similar example of linkage criteria can be found in Kramarz and Thesmar (2006), who use 
the Grand Ecole membership of the boardroom of the most important french firms, and 
Casson (2005) who considers market relations between firms. 
6 Mizruchi (1996); O’Hagan y Green (2004). 
7 Mariolis (1975); Gogel y Koenig (1981). 
8 Allen (1974); Burt (1978); Koenig y Gogel (1981). 
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society and their initial investment. The resulting database includes the name of 
the society, the name of the first shareholders, the capital of the society and their 
distribution among the participants. This source has been refined many times. 
The result allows us to identify the same firm along the years, estimate the 
investment, and the new shareholders9. The persons and firms went to the notary 
for two reasons. First when the firm was funded and, later on, every time they 
made changes in the capital or in the social name. Thought the authors of the 
database built up an investment series of annual data10, we have utilised a 
sample in two different years (1844 – 1854). By this research, we also know 
who were the main investors between 1815 and 1866. To our purpose, we have 
selected individuals whose investments were larger than 500,000 pesetas. They 
were seventy-five people and investment societies (societies which invest in 
other societies). To build the BB net from investment links, we have considered 
all the firms where the members selected had invested, including public limited 
societies. Thought this criteria could be weak nowadays, we should consider that 
the formation of the public limited societies in the 19th century needed the 
promotion of renowned persons with they own investment networks.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the first part, we defined the social 
network, its construction and its analysis. The second part presents and 
compares the two networks that we want to analyse (G net and BB net). Finally, 
we list with the main conclusions. 
  
Social Network Analysis 
Networks obtained from this sort of data are normally called bipartite 
networks. These kinds of networks are composed by two types of elements: 
Individuals and projects or organizations they belong to (or where they meet at). 
                                           
9 A broadly description about the construction of the Base de Dades Empreses i Empresaris a 
la Catalunya del segle XIX can be found in Soler (2003).  
10 Sudrià, Pascual, Castañeda (1992); Sudrià, Pascual (1999). 
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In our particular case, these types of elements correspond to the members of 
Bank directorates and the companies they decided to invest in. The most 
common procedure to manage with these sorts of networks is to separate them 
into two new networks (one for each kind of element). Consequently, we obtain 
two networks from our data, one of investors and another of companies. Since 
our goal in this work is to study the social networks between investors, we have 
focused on the first network. 
All networks are formed by vertices (or nodes) and links (or edges). In our 
particular case, nodes correspond to investors, and a link between two nodes 
means that the connected individuals has decided to invest in the same company, 
at least, once. Such definitions of the edges correspond to the trust links existing 
between investors referred above in the introduction of the paper. Note that 
these trust links reveal not only a certain level of confidence, but also uncover 
possible information flows between investors. 
Once we have built up the networks of investors corresponding to the 
different historical moments described above, we have analyzed them by means 
of methodologies borrowed from Social Network Analysis. More concretely, we 
have represented both networks graphically and have calculated different kinds 
of nodes centrality. 
Graphical representations have been made using Pajek, a computational 
utility which is able to drawn complete graphs from a list of edges between 
vertices. In order to reach more intuitive representations of the networks, we 
have drawn the links in such a way that their width indicates the intensity of the 
relationship between nodes (the thicker the link between two investors, the more 
companies they have invested in jointly). Moreover, we have used an option of 
Pajek which represents the less connected vertices at the periphery of the 
network, leaving the most connected ones in the core. 
Regarding  node centrality measurements, we have applied the three ones 
described by Freeman in (1978) namely: degree, closeness and betweenness 
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centralities. Although all three of them give information about the importance of 
vertices' position in the network, each one of them provides particular 
information that is worth to mention here. 
First, degree centrality of a vertex is calculated by counting how many 
'neighbours' does it have, that is, the number of vertices it is connected to. 
Looking to our networks of investors, an individual with a high degree centrality 
(a 'popular' investment partner) could have a privileged global vision of the 
economical scenario, because of his connections to very different people. 
Second, to calculate betweenness centrality, we first have to obtain the 
shortest paths between all pairs of vertices of the network. By the shortest path 
we mean the shortest list of intermediaries needed to connect two nodes. For 
instance, if two nodes are directly connected, their shortest path has no 
intermediaries at all. Once all shortest paths are defined, betweenness centrality 
of a certain node is calculated as the ratio of critical paths he belongs to over the 
total critical paths existing in the network. In our case, investors with a high 
betweenness centrality occupied an strategically position in relation to 
information flows management, because their intermediate location gave them 
the opportunity to notice (and, probably, control) which information had arrived 
to whom, how and when.  
Third, the closeness centrality measures the 'physical' centrality of each 
node in the network. The node with the highest closeness centrality is the one 
with the shortest (in average) paths to all other nodes in the network. In a 
network where linkage is strongly related to trust, like our network of investors, 
closeness centrality can be associated to individual social capital (seen as those 
potentialities of each individual due to his relationships). An individual with a 
high closeness centrality is 'close' to other individuals, he can easily reach them 
(to obtain information, ask them for a favour or propose a business, for example) 
involving a little number of intermediaries in the operation. 
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One characteristically feature of social networks is that they present a 
community structure, i.e. they are composed by groups or communities of 
individuals that are more densely connected among them than with the rest of 
the population. The community structure of a social network can provide useful 
information, not only at a strictly structural level (who are the members of each 
one of the communities) but also about the relation between structure and 
dynamics (for instance, who are the ‘gatekeepers’ of a certain community, that 
is, the individuals that control the interactions of the community with the rest of 
the network). From the large variety of methods to determine the community 
structure of networks such as social ones (Danon et al., 2005), in the present 
work we have used an algorithm proposed by Duch and Arenas in (2005). 
Finally, we have also compared two networks in terms of their density. In 
order to do that, we have calculated two different indicators of density: Link 
density (Number of links divided by the total possible number of links) and 
clustering coefficient, which measures the density of triangles in the network 
(the number of neighbour that are also neighbours of a common third 
individual). 
 
The investment network composed by the main actors of the Barcelona's 
economic society, at mid 19th century 
In this part we focus in the network resulting of the main investors. We 
want to analyse the investment network resulting by the investment links of a 
random choice of persons with important investment capabilities and, in that 
case, study the characteristics of the network. This could allow us to see the 
investment behaviour of the main players of the Catalan economy, and detect 
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the possible existence of compact groups. The results of this exercise will be 
compared with the characteristics of the BB net studied before11. 
The selected group is formed by the main investors in firms of the mid 
19th century12 (we do not consider the not unipersonal firms as Girona 
Hermanos, Catalana General de Crédito, Crédito Mobiliario Barcelonés o 
Prosperidad Catalana13). The coincidence in an inversion in a firm by one or 
more persons is the criteria used to build the social network14.  
The G net of the highest investors of the Catalan economy shows a usual 
structure in this kind of analysis (see Illustration 1). A densely nucleus with the 
main actors of the system. An outer ring formed by others members connected 
with the main actors with less densely links. A third group of persons, with weak 
connections, which maintains some links with the net. And, the last group, 
formed by the persons with no connections. 
The observation of the network also emphasizes the low number of 
personages that do not share any investment (only a 13% of the total), that 
enlarges to the 33% if we are stricter and we only consider the links among 
individuals that share two or more investments (Illustration 2), revealing a large 
quantity of weak links (which only has a common investment). 
 
                                           
11 A detailed study of the investment network around the members of the board administration 
of the Banco de Barcelona see Blasco, Y.; Lozano, S. y Badia-Miró, M. (2007). 
12 Notice that the most important investor could not mean the richest one.  
13 In this case we assign the investments of these firms to their shareholders. 
14 Though Casson (2005) focused their analysis in the social networks around the markets, he 
thinks that the confidence among different persons could be nexus which link the parts of the 
network. 
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Illustration 1 - G net, formed by the main 75 contributors of Catalonia 
 
Source: Own elaboration from the BDDHiIE-UB 
through Pajek. 
 
We observe the existence of various groups with different degree of 
dependence. First of all, cut off from the network we find the joint investments 
of the Batllo Barrera brothers’ (Felio, Jacinto and Juan). Secondly, other groups 
which are linked to the main net through a simple connection. Those are the 
groups formed by Juan Oliveras and Joaquín Gurri connected to the net through 
Juan Güell Ferrer; Ramon Ribas Boix and Miguel Cantallops Barnola linked 
through Juan Lleó Torroja. And finally, those that only have a simple link as 
Manuel Carbonell Sans connected through Manuel Girona Agrafel; Pablo Soler 
Morell through José Ferrer Vidal; Juan Capmany Carreras through Coma, Ciuró 
y Clavell15; and Ignacio Herrero Buj through José Jover Sans. Though we do not 
have a broadly information of all this persons, we believe that exists a non 
                                           
15 We have maintained in the analysis this firm, firstly because is not a public limited society, 
and secondly because only one of the main investors was in the first seventy five, which is the 
criteria for our analysis. Coma, Ciuro y Clavell was a big commercial firm in Barcelona, 
which the main business was the purchase and the sale of weaves along Spain. See Solà 
(1996). 
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random explanation of all this relations. For example, Pablo Soler Morell was 
born in Vilanova i la Geltrú, not far from Barcelona, as José Ferrer Vidal, and 
the investment coincidence were in the firms participated by Ferrer’s (a cotton 
and a water public service company). The Jover and the Herreros Buj were 
commercial partners in a company which sold weaves in Castilia (Moreno, 
2003). 
Table 1 - Index of degree, closeness and betweenness 
Degree  Closeness  Betweenness  
VIDAL RIBAS, 
JOSE 0,522 
TINTORER 
PASTOR, PABLO 
MARIA 0,583
TINTORER 
PASTOR, PABLO 
MARIA 0,074
TINTORER 
PASTOR, PABLO 
MARIA 0,507 
VIDAL RIBAS, 
JOSE 0,562
SIRVENT 
URGELLES, 
MARIANO 0,061
FABRA ILLAS, 
GIL 
BUENAVENTURA 0,507 
GIRONA 
AGRAFEL, 
IGNACIO 0,556
GUELL FERRER, 
JUAN 0,050
GIRONA 
AGRAFEL, 
IGNACIO 0,478 
FABRA ILLAS, 
GIL 
BUENAVENTURA 0,556
LLEO TORROJA, 
JUAN 0,047
GIRONA 
AGRAFEL, 
MANUEL 0,449 
GIRONA 
AGRAFEL, 
MANUEL 0,543
GIRONA 
AGRAFEL, 
MANUEL 0,043
JOVER SANS, 
JOSE 0,435 
SIRVENT 
URGELLES, 
MARIANO 0,537
FERRER VIDAL, 
JOSE 0,037
GIRONA 
AGRAFEL, 
CASIMIRO 0,435 
SERRA, JOSE 
MARIA 0,531
SALA BRUGUES, 
RAMON 0,037
SIRVENT 
URGELLES, 
MARIANO 0,420 
GIRONA 
AGRAFEL, 
CASIMIRO 0,531
JOVER SANS, 
JOSE 0,035
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SERRA, JOSE 
MARIA 0,420 
JOVER SANS, 
JOSE 0,525
VIDAL RIBAS, 
JOSE 0,030
CLAVE ESPAÑA, 
MIGUEL 0,406 
ASCACIBAR DE 
VILLOTA, 
CELEDONIO 0,519
GIRONA 
AGRAFEL, 
IGNACIO 0,029
ASCACIBAR DE 
VILLOTA, 
CELEDONIO 0,377 
CLAVE ESPAÑA, 
MIGUEL 0,513
FABRA ILLAS, 
GIL 
BUENAVENTURA 0,028
SELLER HUGUET, 
JOSE 0,377 
SELLER HUGUET, 
JOSE 0,502
SERRA, JOSE 
MARIA 0,028
SAFONT LLUCH, 
JAIME 0,362 
TORRENS 
MIRALDA, 
CARLOS 0,497
COMA, CIURO Y 
CLAVELL 0,026
TORRENS 
MIRALDA, 
CARLOS 0,333 
SAFONT LLUCH, 
JAIME 0,492
GIRONA 
AGRAFEL, 
CASIMIRO 0,023
FERRER VIDAL, 
JOSE 0,319 
FERRER VIDAL, 
JOSE 0,487
ASCACIBAR DE 
VILLOTA, 
CELEDONIO 0,021
Source: Own elaboration from the analysis of social network. In black we consider the 
members of the boardroom of the Banco de Barcelona which, also are in the list of the main 
investors of the economic society at mid 19th century. Notice that Juan Güell Ferrer had low 
indexes in the first columns.  
 
Though the visual study of the network permits us to have a first idea of 
the social connections in the network, is necessary the construction of some type 
of numerical indicator that facilitate the identification of the main personages 
inside it, that is to say, the indices of centrality presented further up.   
 
Table 1 shows the fifteenth persons with higher indexes of centrality in 
this investment network. Is not strange that we find similar names in the three 
columns (grade, centrality and betweenness) because all this indexes indicate the 
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central persons of the sample, but the differences in the ranks are so interesting 
for the different nuance that this mean. Specially, the most important persons in 
the third column are in secondary places in the first and the second column. This 
is due to the specific role played for some persons who link different investment 
groups among them. 
José Vidal Ribas, Pablo Maria Tintorer Pastor, Gil Buenaventura Fabra 
Illas, Ignacio Girona Agrafel and Manuel Girona Agrafel lead the centrality list 
(as an indicator of the number of neighbours of every node), that is to say, those 
are the persons which share a higher number of investors. We also find, in an 
important place, the other Girona Agrafel brother, Casimiro, and other members 
of the board administration of the Banco de Barcelona as José Maria Serra and 
Celedonio Ascacibar de Villota (as well as Manuel Girona Agrafel). Juan Güell 
Ferrer, an other member is placed in a lower rank (in the first ring of the 
system). Those persons were important in the Catalan economy of mid 19th 
century. With no doubt, the most important were the Girona brothers’, a family 
of merchants who evolve to financial and banking activities, though they 
participate in a lot of different type of business as the Herrería Barcelones, the 
Ferrocarril de Barcelona a Zaragoza or the Canal de Urgell. Juan Güell Ferrer, 
had amassed his fortune in Cuba and then went to Barcelona, at mid 30s in 19th 
century where he became an cotton businessman. Gil Buenaventura Fabra Illas 
was a Barcelona’s merchant who worked in the waves sector. His nephew was 
the founder of an important weaves firm, Fabra & Coats. Pablo Maria Tintorer, 
José Maria Serra and Celedonio Ascacibar are not as recognised as the others 
but their centrality shows their importance. Jose Maria Serra and Jose Vidal 
Ribas, for their importance in the network and for the amount of their 
investment we believe that he needs a broader research of their biography16. 
                                           
16 See Vicens y Llorens (1983),  Solà (2006), Rodrigo (2006), Blasco (2006). 
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The column of the closeness index shows a similar ranking with the 
important persons in the higher places (this index is an indicator of them who 
were placed in the best position of the network). The differences are in the order 
of the ranking. Pablo Maria Tintorer Pastor and José Vidal Ribas exchanged 
their places, as well as Ignacio Girona Agrafel and Gil Buenaventura Fabra Illas. 
Manuel Girona Agrafel is in the same position but José Maria Serra and 
Celedonio Ascacibar de Vellota raise some positions, lost by José Jové Sans and 
Casimiro Girona Agrafel. 
The betweeness index, used as and index of connections between the 
persons, who do not share investments, show more differences in the ranking. 
The two most important persons are also important in the previous indicators: 
Pablo Maria Tintorer Pastor and Mariano Sirvent Urgelles. In the third position 
we find the first surprise, Juan Güell Ferrer, member of the board administration 
of the bank up to 1948, but a secondary person in the G net. The explanation is 
that he allows that Juan Oliveras and Joaquín Gurri were connected to the 
network. A similar case is José Ferrer Vidal, who is also in an important place in 
the ranking. We have to point out that this is the indicator where the members of 
the boarding administration of the bank had better positions. 
If we filter the initial network considering that two people will be 
connected only if they have two or more joint investments, the results obtained 
are quite significant. With this approximation we want to analyze a 
representative network of more intense linkages among their members (see 
Illustration 2).   
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Illustration 2 - G net, formed by the main 75 contributors of Catalonia 
(with two or more joint investments) 
 
Source: Own elaboration from the BDDHiIE-UB through Pajek. 
 
In this case, the number of persons with no links is higher. It also appears 
two groups with no connections with the main network but with some links 
among them. The first one is the group formed by Antonio López López and 
José Samá Mota. The second one includes José Ferrer Vidal and Fernando Puig 
Gibert. The second group is so interesting because puts José Ferrer Vidal in a 
secondary place and out of the main network. This result stress the importance 
in study the global network and the weakness of it. This result could be 
explained because they were in an early stage in their personal course. Antonio 
López had arrived to Barcelona in 1855, few years later were a member of the 
higher bourgeoisie of Barcelona and his daughter was married with Joan Güell’s 
son. José Samà, was the manager of a firm in La Habana at the end of 1850. José 
Ferrer Vidal was working in Vilanova i La Geltrú between 1844 and 1854, and 
he finally established in Barcelona at mid 50s. The connection between López 
and Samà could be explained for their coincidence in the colonial trade17. 
                                           
17 Seee Rodrigo (1998) y (2000) y Soler (2006).  
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In this new network appeared other secondary persons as Sebastián Aballí 
Prats who is linked through Salvador Bonaplata, Bartolomé Vidal Nadal linked 
through Pedro Juan Garriga Soler and Juan Lleó Torroja through Mariano 
Sirvent Urgelles. 
 
Table 2 - Degree, closeness and betweenness centralities (two or more 
connections) 
Degree  Closeness   Betweenness  
Vidal Ribas, José 0,333 Vidal Ribas, José 0,386 Serra, José Maria 0,043
Girona Agrafel, 
Ignacio 0,304 
Girona Agrafel, 
Ignacio 0,365 Vidal Ribas, José 0,035
Jover Sans, José 0,290 Serra, José Maria 0,359
Girona Agrafel, 
Ignacio 0,029
Fabra Illas, Gil 
Buenaventura 0,290 Jover Sans, José 0,359
Tintorer Pastor, 
Pablo Maria 0,023
Serra, José Maria 0,275 
Fabra Illas, Gil 
Buenaventura 0,359
Sirvent Urgelles, 
Mariano 0,023
Tintorer Pastor, 
Pablo Maria 0,275 
Tintorer Pastor, 
Pablo Maria 0,346 Jover Sans, José 0,023
Girona Agrafel, 
Manuel 0,261 
Girona Agrafel, 
Manuel 0,346
Fabra Illas, Gil 
Buenaventura 0,019
Sirvent Urgelles, 
Mariano 0,246 
Sirvent Urgelles, 
Mariano 0,340 Colomer, José 0,019
Ascacibar de 
Villota, Celedonio 0,246 
Ascacibar de 
Villota, Celedonio 0,340
Ascacibar de 
Villota, Celedonio 0,019
Safont Lluch, Jaime 0,217 Safont Lluch, Jaime 0,329
Girona Agrafel, 
Manuel 0,017
Source: Own elaboration from the analysis of social network. In black we consider the 
members of the boardroom of the Banco de Barcelona which, also are in the list of the main 
investors of the economic society at mid 19th century. Notice that Juan Güell Ferrer had low 
indexes in the first columns.  
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But the most interesting result in this new network is the greater role 
played by Jose Maria Serra. We should remember that he was a member of the 
board administration of the bank and, at the same time, a central member in that 
network. 
The next step is to look the structure of the network and test the existence 
of some compact communities inside it, to see their characteristics (see 
Illustration 3). To perform the analysis and to have more reliable results, we 
work on the network of two or more links (the outcome of this network is 
stronger than in the whole network). We have been able to unbundled 70 
characters into seven groups (six groups with the persons of the network, and 
one with the rest). The six groups are quite different between them in terms of 
number of members. The largest was composed of 16 members six of whom 
were also central members of the G net (José Jover Sans, Juan Lleó Torroja, 
Jose Seller Huguet, Mariano Sirvent Urgelles, Maria Tintorer Pablo Maria 
Tintorer Pastor Shepherd, Carlos Torrents Miralda and Jose Vidal Ribas). 
The second group, also in terms of number of members, was composed by 
10 members and would include three of the four members of the Banco de 
Barcelona. We have already talked about Celedonio Ascacibar de Villota, Juan 
Güell Ferrer and Jose Maria Serra. The third group was formed by the Girona’s 
brothers, their father (Ignacio Girona Targa), and other four persons (eight 
persons in total). The fourth group, much less extensive, is formed by four 
members where the main ones were Bonaplata Salvador and Jose Colomer. 
Finally, we find two couples which were no connected with the main network. 
On the one hand, the couple formed by Antonio Lopez López and Jose Samà 
Mota, and on the other hand, the coupled formed by Jose Ferrer Vidal and 
Fernando Puig Gibert. 
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Illustration 3 - Communities analysis of the G net (two or more joint 
investments) 
 
Source: Own elaboration from the BDDHiIE-UB through Pajek. 
 
A further step in the study of the communities’ composition in the 
network is the analysis of the G net with the incorporation of the investment of 
the members of the board of directors of the Bank of Barcelona. Our objective is 
to test if the members of the bank were randomly distributed in the G net or their 
presence is concentrated in certain groups (see Illustration 4). As in the previous 
exercise, we filtered the network by two or more joint investments18. We must 
be cautious with the result obtained because the strong compaction of this 
network could make a bias in the communities’ analysis due to the fact that this 
new observations had a common investment which is the Banco de Barcelona. 
To fix this we have not considered it. Nevertheless, the further communities’ 
analysis of this new network put together four members of the bank in the group 
leaded by Jose Bonaplata and José Colomer, and also in the group of ten 
members, which were formed by José Maria Serra, Juan Güell and Celedonio 
                                           
18 The Banco de Barcelona network only considers two or more shared investments because 
we do not consider the inversion in that bank. 
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Ascacibar. The new group is composed of 24 members, 15 of whom were 
members of the board of Banco de Barcelona (three already in the network of 
the major contributors and twelve were new). This result shows the significant 
investment group that was generated around the Bank. 
Another relevant data is that the group of the previous network with 
members of the Bank maintained his isolation, despite the inclusion of new 
characters. None of them seemed to have joint investments with the new 
members. In this case, the number of members of the group remains but there 
are some movements of characters. Juan Lleó Torroja, Mariano Sirvent Urgelles 
and Carlos Miralda Torrents had moved toward the group of Girona’s brothers 
and Gil Buenaventura Fabra Illas, Miguel Martorell Peña and Joaquin Prats 
Roquer had come from the group of Güell, Ascacibar and Serra. 
In the other three communities, we want to stress that Girona’s brothers 
were still forming a compact group where the three characters came from the 
larger one, plus two other members of the network of the Banco de Barcelona, 
Juan Plandolit and José Montagut. The other group, which contain the remaining 
members of the Banco de Barcelona (Jose Amell, Jaime Badia, Manuel Compte, 
Jose Parladé and Ignacio Villavecchia), is composed of eight members, of whom 
more than half belongs of the new network. It is remarkable that the two of the 
three members of the network of the largest investors, came from the group of 
Serra, Güell and Ascacibar, and the third one was not part of the main network. 
This reinforces the important role of these three group members as an umbrella 
for the other ones.  
At the end, we can see the couple formed by Antonio López López and 
José Samá Mota had not got connections with the other members of the net. 
Otherwise, the other couple who was alone has changed and now it is part of the 
group of Serra, Güell y Ascacibar (we are talking about José Ferrer Vidal and 
Fernando Puig Gibert). 
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Illustration 4 - Community analysis to the network formed by the G net and 
the members of the administration board of the Banco de Barcelona (only 
links with two or more joint investments) 
 
Source: Own elaboration from the BDDHiIE-UB through Pajek. 
 
Based on the foregoing, we can say that the members of the Banco de 
Barcelona are not distributed randomly among the different groups emerging 
from the network formed by the 70 largest investors. They are grouped into two 
groups arising from whole network. On the other hand, there is a group formed 
by central figures in the overall network as Jose Vidal Ribas, Jose Jover Sans or 
Pablo Maria Tintorer Sans, which do not maintain joint investment with the 
people's Bank of Barcelona. There we also found Carlos Miralda Torrens, which 
sought the establishment of a financial institution after the crisis of 1848 which 
affected the Banco of Barcelona, but it ended in a bankruptcy19. 
 
                                           
19 Arxiu Històric de la Biblioteca de Catalunya, Fons Junta de Comerç, JC XCIII 923-948. 
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The Banco de Barcelona and its investment network 
In Barcelona, prior to the authorization obtained by the Banco de 
Barcelona, only three public limited companies had been formed: Sociedad de 
Navegación e Industria, established in 1841, which came from a company called 
Compañía Catalana de Buques de Vapor, formed in 1833; the Compañía 
Barcelonesa de Seguros Marítimos which was established in April of 1838 and 
the Sociedad Catalana del Alumbrado por Gas in 1843. None of them had more 
than 10 million pesetas of social capital, at the beginnings. The starting 
authorization to the Banco the Barcelona in 1844 marked a significant change in 
the scenario described above. The first evidence of this change was the 
magnitude of capital of the bank, which was formed by 20 million pesetas 
divided into 5,000 shares which enabled almost half a hundred shareholders to 
participate in the establishment of a bank. Its directors opted for a consensus 
strategy on their constitution, and to engage in its board administration at least 
two industrialists. Its statutes required that any shareholder would have on his 
property more than 100 actions, and the vote on the Boards of Shareholders was 
per person and not by amount of shares. This package ensured, apparently, the 
participation of a significant segment of the population in the constitution and 
operation of the Bank. 
The Bank's organizational design was defined by three boards: 
Shareholders, the government and Management. In the first one all the Bank's 
shareholders voted but if they owned up of five shares. This Board elected the 
members of the Governing Board, which is responsible for the Bank's activity 
and decide its evolution. The Board of Directors elected three directors, 
responsible for executive tasks of the entity. 
The hard core of the Bank was composed of his Presidency, 15 members 
elected at the General Meeting. In this first period this group was fairly compact, 
and also remained in the time: in 10 years 10 councillors were changed by the 
death, resignation or no re-election by shareholders. The significant initial 
 23
participation of shareholders, made clear that the elected persons had good 
reputation in the city and they enjoyed the confidence of approximately 70 to 80 
shareholders who came to vote. 
 
Tabla 1 – Members of the administration board of the Banco de Barcelona, 
1845 – 1856 
1 AMELL CARBONELL, JOSÉ 14 MONTAGUT, JUAN 
2 
ASCACIBAR DE VILLOTA, 
CELEDONIO 15 PARLADE, JOSE 
3 BADIA, JAIME 16
PASCUAL INGLADA, SEBASTIAN 
ANTON 
4 COMA MIRO, TOMAS 17 PEYRA MACH, AGUSTIN 
5 COMPTE, MANUEL 18 PLANDOLIT, JOSE 
6 FLAQUER PADRINES, MARIANO 19 RICART GUITART, JAIME 
7 GATELL, ESTEBAN 20 ROIG ROM, MIGUEL 
8 GIRONA AGRAFEL, MANUEL 21 SERRA FARRERAS, JOSE 
9 
GONZALVEZ DE FARIA, 
SERAFIN 22
SERRA FARRERAS, 
LEODEGARIO 
10 GUELL FERRER, JUAN 23 SERRA MUÑOZ, JOSE MARIA 
11 LERENA, MANUEL DE 24 TRESSERA, JUAN ANTONIO 
12 LLUCH GARRIGA, MARIANO 25 VILLAVECCHIA VIANI, IGNACIO
13 MARTÍ CODOLAR, JOAQUÍN   
Source: Banco de Barcelona. Actas Juntas de Accionistas del Banco de Barcelona. Arxiu 
Històric Nacional de Catalunya. We have included all the persons who were members of the 
Junta de Gobierno of the Banco, though some of them were it only for some months, as 
Montagut. 
 
In this paper we built a representation of the social network, from the 
information related to the investment participation of these people, and we have 
studied it through their analysis techniques. We have established that a link 
between two persons appears when they have made, at least, a joint investment 
in a single company (different from the Banco de Barcelona which is not 
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considered because it could bias the exercises). As the first exercises, this is a 
first step and we should study other kind of relations among the members of the 
economic society and filter by other characteristics as the different types of 
existing business, or other relationships of trust such as the sharing of the boards 
of administration in other companies. 
To build the network investment, we considered all the persons who had 
been members of the Board of the Bank and the investments that performed 
together on the same criteria that followed in the construction of the earlier 
network. 
 
Illustration 5 – Investment network of the members of the Board 
Administration of the Banco de Barcelona, 1854 
 
Source: Own elaboration from the BDDHiIE-UB through Pajek. 
 
In Illustration 5 we can see the network emerged for joint investments by 
members of the Board of Directors of the Bank. From Blasco et al (2007) we 
can see the evolution of the network and compaction of their investments. They 
detect the importance and centrality of some persons, sometimes forgotten as 
Jose Maria Serra (also a member of the network of the largest investors), Miguel 
Roig i Rom and Manuel de Lerena. We also find, at preferential places, 
 25
Celedonio Ascacibar, while Juan Güell and Manuel Girona are placed in 
secondary positions. 
 
Tabla 2 – Indexes of the members of the Board Administration of the Banco 
de Barcelona 
Degree  Closeness  Betweenness  
Lerena, Manuel 
de 0,830 
Serra, Jose 
Maria 0,192 
Serra, Jose 
Maria 0,860 
Roig Rom, 
Miguel 0,830 
Serra Farreras, 
José 0,083 
Lerena, Manuel 
de 0,830 
Serra, Jose 
Maria 0,830 
Lerena, Manuel 
de 0,049 
Roig Rom, 
Miguel 0,830 
Pascual Inglada, 
Sebastián Antón 0,790 
Roig Rom, 
Miguel 0,049 
Pascual Inglada, 
Sebastián Antón 0,800 
Ascacibar de 
Villota, 
Celedonio 0,750 
Villavecchia, 
Ignacio 0,042 
Ascacibar de 
Villota, 
Celedonio 0,770 
Badia, Jaime 0,750 
Pascual Inglada, 
Sebastián Antón 0,038 Badia, Jaime 0,770 
Villavecchia, 
Ignacio 0,750 
Comas Miró, 
Tomàs 0,021 
Villavecchia, 
Ignacio 0,770 
Comas Miró, 
Tomàs 0,710 Parladé, José 0,020 
Comas Miró, 
Tomàs 0,750 
González de 
Faria, Serafín 0,710 Badia, Jaime 0,018 
González de 
Faria, Serafín 0,750 
Martí Codoloar, 
Joaquín 0,710 
Flaquer Padrines, 
Mariano 0,018 
Martí Codoloar, 
Joaquín 0,750 
Flaquer Padrines, 
Mariano 0,670 
Ascacibar de 
Villota, 
Celedonio 0,017 
Flaquer Padrines, 
Mariano 0,730 
Gatell, Esteban 0,670 
Martí Codoloar, 
Joaquín 0,012 Gatell, Esteban 0,730 
Peyra Mach, 0,670 Plandolit, José 0,008 Peyra Mach, 0,730 
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Agustín Agustín 
Plandolit, José 0,630 
González de 
Faria, Serafín 0,007 Plandolit, José 0,710 
Tresserra, Juan 
Antonio 0,630 
Tresserra, Juan 
Antonio 0,006 
Tresserra, Juan 
Antonio 0,710 
Güell Ferrer, 
Juan 0,540 Montagut, Juan 0,005 
Güell Ferrer, 
Juan 0,670 
Parladé, José 0,540 Gatell, Esteban 0,004 Parladé, José 0,670 
Ricart Guitart, 
Jaime 0,380 
Peyra Mach, 
Agustín 0,004 
Ricart Guitart, 
Jaime 0,600 
Montagut, Juan 0,330 
Güell Ferrer, 
Juan 0,003 Montagut, Juan 0,560 
Amell Carbonell, 
José 0,290 
Amell Carbonell, 
José 0,002 
Girona Agrafel, 
Manuel 0,550 
Girona Agrafel, 
Manuel 0,250 Compte, Manuel 0,000 
Amell Carbonell, 
José 0,530 
Compte, Manuel 0,210 
Girona Agrafel, 
Manuel 0,000 
Lluch Garriga, 
Mariano 0,520 
Lluch Garriga, 
Mariano 0,170 
Lluch Garriga, 
Mariano 0,000 Compte, Manuel 0,510 
Serra Farreras, 
José 0,080 
Ricart Guitart, 
Jaime 0,000 
Serra Farreras, 
José 0,490 
Serra Farreras, 
Leodegario 0,040 
Serra Farreras, 
Leodegario 0,000 
Serra Farreras, 
Leodegario 0,330 
Source: Banco de Barcelona. Actas Juntas de Accionistas del Banco de Barcelona. Arxiu 
Històric Nacional de Catalunya. We have included all the persons who were members of the 
Junta de Gobierno of the Banco, though some of them were it only for some months, as 
Montagut. In black we find the members which also appear in the network of the most 
important investments. 
 
These results stress the importance of José Maria Serra in the overall 
Catalan Economy at the time, also as an investor in the network that was formed 
around the Banco de Barcelona. 
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Similarities and differences between the two investment networks 
The analysis of the two investment systems highlights a relevant fact. The 
network of Banco de Barcelona is significantly more compact than the network 
built among major investors in the Catalonia in the mid-nineteenth century (see 
Table 5). This is a stronger proof of the importance of the BB net as a special 
case.  
Tabla 3 – Indexes among networks. 
 
Link 
density20 
Clustering 
coefficient 
BB 0,335 0,772 
CAT (up to one 
joint investment) 0,185 0,604 
CAT (up to two 
joint investment) 0,073 0,368 
 
 
 The two indices of Table 5 shows as the values for the Banco de 
Barcelona are higher, even considering the Catalan network without restrictions, 
that is, considering the network up to a common investment. The links density 
shows higher values in the Banco de Barcelona network (approximately 1.8 
times higher). The differences in the clustering coefficient are lower but 
remained the stronger compaction of the of BB net (1.3 times). As expected, in 
the network filtered by two or more links, the differences in the rates of 
compaction between the two networks are even lower (4.6 times and 2.1 times 
the density for clustering coefficient). 
 This fact confirms what we have already found in a qualitative sense. The 
members of the Board Administration of the Bank were grouped as a 
                                           
20 Number of existing linkages (without considering the number of joint firms)/all of possible 
links (without considering the number of joint firms). 
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community of investors and their investment network were compact. For next 
studies we have to analyze the characteristics that define each group, those who 
are part of the network of the Bank, and those who are outside and detect 
possible common features among them. 
 
Conclusions 
 During the early stages of the globalization and given the level of 
economic, social and information technologies, we would expect that the capital 
market would operate around social networks that minimize information costs. 
The existence of certain groups with reputation and financial capabilities, which 
maintained trade, proximity or familiar relations with those who had economic 
capacity, should encourage the movement of capital towards the investment in 
the industry, the trade or the transport sectors. The emergence of modern 
financial institutions affected, of course, this situation. However, it did not 
always influence as one would expect from economic theory: attracting private 
capital to reinvest it later. The Banco de Barcelona and the Catalan banking 
system of the 19th century are an example of how financial institutions do not 
always go hand in hand with the industrial development and with the economic 
development in general. In that sense we have to ask ourselves about their role. 
To do that we have compared the persons who were part of the Board 
Administration of the Banco de Barcelona and the group formed by the largest 
investors in corporations in the 19th century Catalonian economy, using the 
quantitative methodology of the social network analysis commonly used in other 
areas. 
 One of the main results of our analysis has a direct impact on the role 
played by the Bank in the overall economy. It seems clear, as the literature has 
established so far, that this financial institution had no direct impact on the 
industrial and the commercial investment. After the establishment of the Bank, 
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businesses continued to fund their fixed assets through reinvestment of profits 
while they had to finance the capital requirements, they use to turn to their own 
shareholder’s credit. Even in the short-term credit market, the Bank had a fairly 
relative weight. Instead of, the bank was important as an issuing institution, 
although this is not relevant here. Thought the fact that the bank accepted the 
share of the commercial and industrial firms, as a guarantee of a loan, push up 
the development of the public limited companies. 
 Our analysis shows that the social network formed around this institution 
helped to link several isolated networks that were either scattered or in process 
of formation. This argument is reinforced by the analysis of the structure of the 
investment network. The group with no members of the bank was formed by 
people who had a stake in other financial institutions21. Thus, José Jover was 
linked to the family Herrero who had a trade’s house, and since the 1850s their 
financial activities were dominant over the strictly commercial activities. On the 
other hand, Carlos Torrents Miralda was the representative of the English 
engineer established in Belgium, John Cockerill, and we know that he had his 
own adventure in the financial world before the foundation of the Banco de 
Barcelona. To end the checking of this group, Pablo Maria Tintorer attended in 
the Caja Catalana Industrial y Mercantil. 
 Beyond the BB net, the analysis of the network and its structure allows us 
to show how, in the context of a dynamical economy, as was the Catalan 
economy between the period over the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the crisis 
of the cotton hunger, a social network was structured and became the hard core 
of the Barcelona bourgeoisie until the Civil War of 1936-39. 
 So, after the demonstration of the existence of several investment 
networks we have analyzed their structure. We have deduced the existence of 
several groups of different typologies. On the one hand, there is a group of 
                                           
21 Anes and Otazu (1987) 
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investors who had their roots in the trade and manufacturing sector of mid 18th 
century, had born at the end of this century and towards 1840 were mature. This 
was the case of Salvador Bonaplata and Josep Colomer, partners in the 
adventure of El Vapor, the first firm of yarn and cotton with a steam engine22. 
 Secondly, we would be faced with that group who would be coming into 
full maturity, but they had not got relationship with the traditional bourgeoisie of 
the 18th century. That includes José Jover, Juan Lleó, José Seller, Mariano 
Sirvent, Pablo Maria Tintorer, Carlos Torrents and José Vidal which were born 
out of Barcelona23 and their first business steps in the trade sector. The last 
group, called the "new investors", it is formed for persons who had born after 
1800 and we can found persons as the Girona’s brothers, leaded by Manuel, and 
the "Indians" as Celedonio Ascacíbar, Juan Güell and José María Serra24. In this 
group of "new investors" we must consider those who joined the Barcelona’s 
bourgeoisie after the founding of the bank. We are talking about Antonio Lopez, 
Juan Samà, José Vidal Ferrer and Fernando Puig, which had been born in mid 
1810s as Manuel Girona, and were linked with the “Indians” through familiarity 
relations, who had landed or were landed in Barcelona after 1830. We have 
already mentioned the case of Ascacíbar, Güell and Serra. Antonio Lopez and 
Juan Samà also had come back to Barcelona after a stay of several years in La 
Havana. Jose Ferrer Vidal came from a village with great tradition of emigration 
to America and ended up marrying with a woman born in La Havana (Soler, 
2006). Manuel Girona, also married with an "Indian’s" daughter (Carolina 
                                           
22 Nadal (1983) 
23 José Jover (Copons), Juan Lleó (Reus), José Seller (Maó), Mariano Sirvent (La Havana), 
Pablo Maria Tintorer (Tarragona), Carlos Torrents (Manresa) and José Vidal (Sant Feliu de 
Llobregat). 
24 We understand as an Indian all the persons who went to the Spanish colonies in Latin 
America (o who were born there), and after then, they participate in the colonial trade sector 
and then come back to Catalonia, with more or less money. Celedonio Ascacibar, José Maria 
Serra was born in Santiago de Chile. Juan Güell was born in Torredembarra (near to 
Tarragona), he had gone to Veracruz and, before he came back, he went to La Habana 
(Rodrigo, 2006). 
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Quadras) born in Venezuela and member of one of the most important families 
in the economy of mid 19th century in Barcelona. Only Fernando Puig could not 
be classified in this typology. 
 To sum up, the analysis of the investment networks shows that, in the fast 
growing economy of Barcelona in mid 19th, there were several networks that 
helped to channel funds into inversion. We have also detected a group, called 
"new investors", which would be consolidated and became the dominant elite of 
the Catalan economy until the outbreak of the Civil War in 1936. It was in this 
network, where the Banco de Barcelona played a key role in the consolidation 
and compacting of the groups who were formed around it. 
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Annex 1 
Table 4 - 70 main investors of Catalonia. 
1 ABALLI PRATS, SEBASTIAN 36 JORDA (VDA. DE E HIJOS) 
2 ACHON MEURON, JUAN 37 JOVER SANS, JOSE 
3 ALBAREDA VALLES, JOSE 38 LLEO TORROJA, JUAN 
4 
ASCACIBAR DE VILLOTA, 
CELEDONIO 39 LLOPART LLEO, JUAN 
5 BALTA, JOAQUIN 40 LOPEZ LOPEZ, ANTONIO 
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6 BATLLO BARRERA, FELIO 41 MARTORELL PEÑA, MIGUEL 
7 BATLLO BARRERA, JACINTO 42 MASRIERA VIDAL, JOSE 
8 BATLLO BARRERA, JUAN 43 MASRIERA VIDAL, JUAN 
9 BOADA VILOMARA, MIGUEL 44 MIRALLES GIL, JORGE 
10 BOFILL PINTO, JUAN MANUEL 45
MUNTADAS CAÑELLAS, 
BERNARDO 
11 BONAPLATA, SALVADOR 46 NADAL Y RIBO 
12 BOSCH LABRUS, PEDRO 47 ODENA PUJOL, JOSE 
13 BUXEDA CREUET, MIGUEL 48 OLIVERAS, JUAN 
14 
CANTALLOPS BARNOLA, 
MIGUEL 49 PAUL PIMONT, EDUARDO 
15 CAPMANY CARRERAS, JUAN 50
PLANAS COMPTE, JOSE 
MANUEL 
16 CARBONELL SANS, MANUEL 51 PRATS ROQUER, JOAQUIN 
17 CERIOLA CASTELLA, JAIME 52 PUIG GIBERT, FERNANDO 
18 CLAVE ESPAÑA, MIGUEL 53 PUIGMARTI MATAS, RAMON 
19 CLAVE VIDAL, JUAN BTA. 54 RIBAS BOIX, RAMON 
20 COLOMER, JOSE 55 ROMA, JOAQUIN DE 
21 COLOMER, JUAN 56 SAFONT LLUCH, JAIME 
22 COMA, CIURO Y CLAVELL 57 SALA BRUGUES, RAMON 
23 ESPARO, VALENTIN 58 SAMA MOTA, JOSE 
24 FABRA FONTANILLS, CAMILO 59 SANTALO VIÑALS, RUPERTO 
25 
FABRA ILLAS, GIL 
BUENAVENTURA 60 SELLER HUGUET, JOSE 
26 FERRER VIDAL, JOSE 61 SERRA FRANCH, JOAQUIN 
27 GARRIGA SOLER, PEDRO JUAN 62 SERRA, JOSE MARIA 
28 GIRONA AGRAFEL, CASIMIRO 63 SIRVENT URGELLES, MARIANO
29 GIRONA AGRAFEL, IGNACIO 64 SOLER MORELL, PABLO 
30 GIRONA AGRAFEL, MANUEL 65
TINTORER PASTOR, PABLO 
MARIA 
31 GIRONA TARGA, IGNACIO 66 TORRENS MIRALDA, CARLOS 
32 GRIMALDI, JUAN DE 67 TOUS MIRALPEIX, NICOLAS 
33 GUELL FERRER, JUAN 68 TOUS SOLER, FCO. 
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34 GURRI, JOAQUIN 69 VIDAL NADAL, BARTOLOME 
35 HERRERO BUJ, IGNACIO 70 VIDAL RIBAS, JOSE 
 
